v v e e e r r r n n n a a a n n n c c c e e e a a n n n a In strategic games with many semi-anonymous players all the equilibria are structurally robust. The equilibria survive under structural alterations of the rules of the game and its information structure, even when the game is embedded in bigger games. Structural robustness implies ex-post Nash conditions and a stronger condition of information-proofness. It also implies fast learning, self-purification and strong rational expectations in market games. Structurally robust equilibria may be used to model games with highly unspecified structures, such as games played on the web.
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Background on large games
Earlier literature on large (many players) cooperative games is surveyed in Aumann and Shapley (1974) . For large strategic games, see Schmeidler (1973) and the follow-up literature on the purification of Nash equilibria. There is also substantial literature on large games with special structures, for example large auctions as reported in Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) .
Unlike the above, this survey concentrates on the structural robustness of (general)
Bayesian games with many semi-anonymous players, as developed in Kalai (2004; 2005) . (For additional notions of robustness in game theory, see Bergemann and Morris, 2005) .
Main message and examples
In simultaneous-move Bayesian games with many semi-anonymous players, all Nash equilibria are structurally robust. The equilibria survive under structural alterations that 2 relax the simultaneous-play assumptions, and permit information transmission, revisions of choices, communication, commitments, delegation, and more.
Large economic and political systems and distributive systems such as the Web are examples of environments that give rise to such games. Immunity to alterations means that Nash equilibrium predictions are valid even in games whose structure is largely unknown to modellers or to players.
The next example illustrates immunity of equilibrium to revisions, or being ex-post Nash, see Cremer and McLean (1985) , Green and Laffont (1987) and Wilson (1987) for early examples.
Example 1. Ex post stability illustrated in match pennies
Simultaneously, each of k males and k females chooses one of two options, H or T.
The payoff of every male is the proportion of females his choice matches and the payoff of every female is the proportion of males her choice mismatches. (When k = 1 this is the familiar match-pennies game.) Consider the mixed-strategy equilibrium where every player chooses H or T with equal probabilities.
Structural robustness implies that the equilibrium must be ex post Nash: it should survive in alterations that allow players to revise their choices after observing their opponents' choices. Clearly this is not the case when k is small. But as k becomes large, the equilibrium becomes arbitrarily close to being ex post Nash. More precisely, the Prob[some player can improve his payoff by more than ε ex-post] decreases to zero at an exponential rate as k becomes large.
Example 2. Invariance to sequential play illustrated in a computer choice game
Simultaneously, each of n players chooses one of two computers, I or M. 
Structural robustness
A mixed-strategy (Nash) equilibrium
person strategic game G is structurally robust if it remains an equilibrium in every structural alteration of G. Such an alteration is described by an extensive game, , and for σ to remain an equilibrium in means that every adaptation of σ to , 
includes the (original) G-players:
The players of constitute a superset of the
G-players (the players of G).
A A 2. Unaltered type structure: At the first stage of , the G-players are assigned a profile of types by the same prior probability distribution as in G. Every player is informed of his own type. For the sake of brevity, the next section discusses full structural robustness. But all the observations presented there also hold for the properly defined approximate counterparts. For example, the fact that structural robustness implies ex post Nash also implies that approximate structural robustness implies approximate ex post Nash. The implications of approximate (as opposed to full) structural robustness are important, due to the asymptotic nature of the structural robustness theorem.
Implications of structural robustness
Structural robustness of an equilibrium σ in a game G is a strong property, because the set of G-alterations that σ must survive is rich. The simple examples below are meant to suggest the richness of its implications, with the first two examples showing how it implies the notions already discussed (see Dubey and Kaneko, 1984 for related issues). 
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i as he does in the simultaneous-move game G. Structural robustness of σ implies that this adaptation of σ must be an equilibrium in every such . GS Moreover, the above reasoning continues to hold even if the order of play is determined dynamically, and even if it is strategically controlled by G-players and outsiders. Thus, a structurally robust equilibrium is invariant to the order of play in a strong sense.
Remark 4. Invariance to revelation and delegation
G with delegation, G , is the following (n + 1)-players game. The original n Gplayers are assigned types as in G. In a first round of simultaneous play, every G-player chooses between (1) self-play and (2) delegate-the-play and report a type to an outsider, player n + 1. In a second round of simultaneous play all the self-players choose their own G pure strategies, and the outsider chooses a profile of G pure strategies for all the delegators. The payoffs of the G players are as in G; the outsider may be assigned any payoffs. Because it is unaffected by the answers to such questions, a structurally robust equilibrium σ of the one-simultaneous-move game can be played on the Web in a variety of ways without losing the equilibrium property. For example, players may make their choices according to their σ i probabilities prior to the beginning of the click-in period, then go to the Web and click in their realized choices at individually selected times.
Remark 6. Competitive prices in Shapley-Shubik market games
For a simple illustration, consider the following n-trader market game (see Shapley and Shubik, 1977 , and later references in Geanakoplos, 2003, and McLean, Peck and Postlewaite, 2005) . There are two fruits, apples and bananas, and a finite number of trader types. A type describes the fruit a player owns and the fruit he likes to consume. The players' types are determined according to individual independent prior 8 probability distributions. Each trader knows his own type, and his payoff depends on his own type and the fruit he ends up with, as well as on the distribution of types and fruit ownership of his opponents (externalities are allowed, for example, a player may wish to own the fruit that most opponents like). In one simultaneous move, every player has to choose between (1) keeping his fruit and (2) trading it for the other kind.
The banana/apple price is determined proportionately (with one apple and banana added in to avoid division by zero). For example, if 199 bananas and 99 apples are traded, the price of bananas to apples would be (199 + 1)/(99 + 1) = 2, that is, every traded apple brings back two bananas and every traded banana brings back 0.5 apples.
With a small number of traders, the price is unlikely to be competitive. If players are allowed to re-trade after the realized price becomes known, they would, and a new price would emerge.
However, when n is large, approximate structural robustness implies being approximately information-proof. So even when the realized price becomes known, no player has significant incentive to re-trade, that is, the price is approximately competitive (Prob[some player can ε -improve his expected payoff by re-trading at the observed price] ρ ≤ ). This is stronger than classical results relating Nash equilibrium to Walras equilibrium (for example, Dubey, Mas Colell and Shubik, 1980) . First, being conducted under incomplete information, the above relates Bayesian equilibria to rational expectations equilibria (rather than Walras). Also the competitive property described here is substantially stronger, due to the immunity of the equilibria to alterations represented by extensive games. If allowance is made for spot markets, coordinating institutions, trade on the Web, and so on, the Nash-equilibrium prices of the simple simultaneous-move game are sustained through the intermediary steps that may come up under such possibilities.
Remark 7. Embedding a game in bigger worlds
Alterations allow the inclusion of outside players who are not from G. Moreover, the restrictions imposed on the strategies and payoffs of the outsiders are quite limited. This means that alterations may describe bigger worlds in which G is embedded. Structural robustness of an equilibrium means that the small-world (G) equilibrium remains an equilibrium even when the game is embedded in such bigger worlds.
Remark 8. Self-purification Schmeidler (1973) shows that in a normal-form game with a continuum of anonymous players, every strategy can be purified, that is, for every mixed-strategy equilibrium one can construct a pure-strategy equilibrium (Ali Khan and Sun, 2002 survey some of the large follow-up literature).
The ex post Nash property above constitutes a stronger (but asymptotic) result. Since the resulting play of a mixed strategy equilibrium yields pure-strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria (of the perfect information game), one does not need to construct purestrategy equilibria: simply playing a mixed-strategy equilibrium yields pure-strategy profiles that are equilibria.
The approximate statement is: for every (ε,ρ) for sufficiently large n, Prob[ending at a pure strategy profile that is not an ε Nash equilibrium of the realized perfect information game] ≤ ρ. Since both ε and ρ can be made arbitrarily small, this is asymptotic purification. Note that the model of Schmeidler, with a continuum of players, requires non-standard techniques to describe a continuum of independent random variables (the mixed strategies of the players). The asymptotic result stated here, dealing always with finitely many players, does not require any non-standard techniques. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) show that in playing an equilibrium of a Bayesian repeated game, after a sufficiently long time the players best-respond as if they know their opponents' realized types and, hence, their mixed strategies.
Remark 9. 'As if' learning
But being information-proof, at a structurally robust equilibrium (even of a one shot game) players' best respond (immediately) as if they know their opponents' realized types, their mixed strategies and even the pure-strategies they end up with. Consider the equilibrium where player 1 chooses the computer he was told was better and every other player chooses I or M with equal probabilities. This equilibrium fails to be ex post Nash (and hence, fails structural robustness), especially as n becomes large, because after the play approximately one-half of the players would want to revise their choices to match the observed choice of player 1. (With a small n there may be 'accidental ex post Nash', but it becomes extremely unlikely as n becomes large.) This failure is due to discontinuity of the payoff functions. The proportions of I-better types and M-better types in this game must be either (1/n, 0) or (0, 1/n), because only one of the n players is to be one of these types. Yet, whatever n is, every player's payoff is
